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DEFERRAL:
CONSIDER ENDING IT,
INSTEAD OF EXPANDING IT

by J. Clifton Fleming Jr., Robert J.
Peroni, and Stephen E. Shay

II

I
In Notice 98-35, the U'.S. Treasury Department asked
for comments on the continued
viability of the policy
objectives underlying subpart
F.l A number of commentators have responded,
including the National
Foreign Trade Council, Inc., which has published
a
comprehensive study (the NFTC study)' of the" deferral privilege." Subsequently,
the House Ways and
Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee
held hearings on the impact of U.s. tax rules on international competitiveness
and on international
tax
reform, respectively, both of which focused in part on
the deferral privilege and the proper scope of subpart
F. Last summer, both houses of Congress approved
a
tax bill that would have reduced the scope of subpart
F by adding additional exceptions to its rules, but President Clinton vetoed the bill in September.
The deferral privilege is the feature of U.S. international income tax law that generally allows a U.S. person to conduct business or investment activity abroad
through a foreign corporation
without paying U.S. tax
on the corporation's foreign-source earnings until they
are distributed to the U.s. person or the U.S. person
sells the foreign corporation's
stock' When the foreign
country involved is one that imposes only low rates of
tax, this privilege allows U.S. taxpayers to defer substantial amounts of u.s. tax at the cost of only a small
foreign levy.' Hence, the deferral privilege operates
as
a tax "subsidy" for U.S. persons with corporate operations in low-tax foreign countries'
This subsidy
provides a major incentive
for U'S. persons to conduct
business operations in foreign countries that impose

J. Clifton
Fleming, Jr. is associate dean and
Ernest L. Wilkinson Professor of Law at Brigham
Young University.
Robert J. Peroni is Robert
Kram~r Research Professor of Law at George
Washmgton
University. Stephen
E. Shay is a
partner with Ropes & Gray in Boston.
In this report, the authors argue that the case
for deferral of U.S. tax on foreign-source business
income has not been, and is unlikely to be, met,
and that Congress should consider ending the
deferral
regime by adopting
a passthrough
regime in its place.
Copyright
1999 by J. Clifton
Fleming, Jr.,
Robert J. Peroni, and Stephen E. Shay. All rights
reserved.
Portions of the introduction
and the
first, third, fourth, and seventh parts of this article
are based
on an earlier article by the authors,
Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, [r., and
Stephen E. Shay, "Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferrai
of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income," 52 SMU L. Rev. 455 (1999), and are included here with the permission of the SMU Law

Review.

Table of Contents
The EXisting

Scope of the Deferral

The Incongruity

Privilege

.. 839

of Elective Deferral

841

Exploring the Substance of the Deferral Privilege

843

Flaws in the Operation

845

Transfer Pricing
Regimes

of the Deferral

Privilege

Rules & the Antideferral
····

Portfolio Investment

,

..

.• Our Pass through Proposal
.
• TranSltion
'.
h
From a Deferral to a Passt roug h
System. . .
..
.... . ..
Conclusions

. .846

.
....

.847
.. 847

.., .850

'Notice 98-35, 1998-27 lRB 35. For the reproposed Notice
98-35 regulations, see Doc 1999-23565 (34 original pages); 1999
TNT 132-22,
2Nationa:Foreign Tr~de Council, ~c., "The NFrC Foreign
IncomeProject:International TaxPolicyfor the 21st Century:
Part One: A Reconsideration of Subpart F/' Doc 1999-11623
(140 original pages), 1999 TNT 58-17 [hereinafter NFTC study].
-See,e.g., Charles H. Gustafson, Robert J. Peroni and
Richard Crawford Pugh, Taxation of International Transactions
335-36 (1997).
41f the foreigncountry incom~ tax uses rates approaching,
or greate.r~an, U.S.rates, t~ere is usually no significant U.S.
tax remaining after the credit for foreigntaxes and theref
deferral is usually not an issue.
,ore,
sSee infra text accompanying notes 57-66.
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little or no tax on the earnings of a resident corporation.
This deferral subsidy violates the tax policy principle
of capital export neutrality'
To prevent abuse of the deferral privilege, Congress
over the years has enacted a number of so-called "antideferral" regimes,
which curtail deferral
in certain
specified circumstances
but leave the privilege intact
in a large residual area? The most important
and comprehensive of these antideferral regimes is the controlled foreign corporation provisions found in subpart
F of the code.'

I

Rather than narrowing subpart F's
deferral restrictions, Congress should
consider ending the deferral privilege
by adopting a passthrough regime,

The recent debate over subpart F has been narrowly
framed in terms of the effect of subpart F on the competitiveness
of U.S.-parented
multinationals.
The

'Under capital export neutrality, a Ij.S. person should pay
the same total (U .5. and foreign) tax on all income, regardless
of whether the income is from U.S. or foreign sources. Thus,
capital export neutrality is aimed at reducing the influence of
tax considerations
on the decision whether to locate investments in the United States or in a foreign country. See, e.g.,
Gustafson, Peroni, and Pugh, supra note 3, at 17; see also David
P. Hariton, "Notice 98~11 Notwithstanding,
What Should Be
Done With Subpart F?" Tax Notes, Apr. 20, 1998, p. 388. For
the view by one leading commentator that, under certain circumstances, deferral of home country tax on foreign-source
income can enhance economic efficiency, see James R. Hines,
[r., "The Case Against Deferral: A Deferential
Reconsideration," 52 Nat'l Tax 1- 385 (1999)(arguing that deferral might
increase economic efficiency but that, at present, the evidence
is inconclusive
and that more work needs
to be done)
[hereinafter Hines,
"Deferral: A Deferential
Reconsiderstion"].
"Ihe deferral privilege has been the subject of extensive
commentary. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, "To End Deferral
as We Know It: Simplification Potential of Check-the-Box,"
Tax Notes, Jan. 13, 1997, p. 219 [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, "End
Deferral"]; Asim Bhansali, Note, "Globalizing
Consolidated
Taxation of United States Multinationals," 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1401
(1996); Daniel J. Frisch, "The Economics of International
Tax
Policy: Some Old and New Approaches," Tax Notes, Apr. 30,
1990, p. 581; Jane G. Gravelle, "Foreign Tax Provisions of the

American Jobs Act of 1996,"Tax Notes, Aug. 26, 1996, p. 1165;
Robert A. Green, "The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the
Income of Multinational
Enterprises," 79 Cornell L. Rev. 18
(1993); Hines, "Deferral:
A Deferential Reconsideration,"
supra note 6; Joseph Isenbergh, "Perspectives on the Deferral
of U.S. Taxation of the Earnings of Foreign Corporations,"
66
Taxes 1062 (1988); John McDonald, Comment, "Anti-Deferral
Deferred: A Proposal
for the Reform of International
Tax
Law," 16 Nw. J. Tn!,l L. & Bus. 248 (1995); Peter Merrill and
Carol Dunahoo, "<Runaway Plant' Legislation: Rhetoric and
Reality," Tax Notes, July 8, 1996,p. 221; Paul W. Oosterhuis
and Roseann M. Cutrone, "The Cost of Deferral's
Repeal: If
Do~e Properly, It Los~; Bil~i?~s," Tax Notes, Feb. 8, 1993, p.
765, Stephen E. Shay, Revisiting U.S. Anti-Deferral
Rules"
74 Taxes 1042 (1996).
'
"Sections 951-964.
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proponents
of reducing the scope of subpart F, however, have not candidly acknowledged
the broad nature of the scope of the existing deferral privilege (particularly after the repeal of the excess passive a~set
rules of former section 9S6A m 1996 and the elimination of the controlled foreign
corporation/passive
foreign investment company overlap in 1997) and that
the deferral privilege operates
as a tax subsidy for
foreign operations. More importantly,
they have not
analyzed
whether the operation
of the deferral
privilege is an efficient subsidy.
We are tax policy commentators, not economists,
and claim no special expertise in the economics arena.
Nonetheless,
we could stipulate
the correctness
of
some of the arguments put forward by proponents
of
deferral (including the authors
of the NFTC study),
without
being persuaded
that they are sufficient to
justify the deferral privilege.
For example, we agree
that the global economy has changed dramatically
since 1962 and that foreign investment is beneficial to
the U.S. economy. We also strongly favor free and open
international
trade of goods and services and would
disfavor measures (tax or otherwise)
specifically designed
to reduce international
trade. On the other
hand, we believe the deferral privilege, like any other
tax subsidy, can only be justified
by a cost/benefit
analysis. In the case of deferral, this would ultimately
require
a showing that the benefited foreign-source
income from operations outside
the United States is
deserving of a lower effective tax rate than income from
equally productive activity in the United States. We do
not believe that such a showing has been made.
The proponents of deferral, including the authors of
the NFTC study, argue that the deferral privilege is
necessary to make U.S. businesses competitive overseas and that subpart F's modest limitations on deferral
of U.S. tax on foreign-source
business income should
be curtailed so that subpart
F's coverage would be
restricted to primarily foreign-source passive income."
We disagree. We conclude that the proponents of deferral have the burden of proving
that the deferral
privilege is indeed necessary to overcome tax advantages enjoyed by foreign competitors that actually
undermine
the competitiveness
of U.S. businesses
operating abroad, and that this burden of proof has not
been, and is unlikely to be, met. In our view, rather
than narrowing subpart F's deferral restrictions, Congress should consider ending the deferral privilege by
adopting a passthrough regime that we describe in part
VII of this article.

'See NFTC study, supra note 2, at xxi, 6-28-1506-29. For
another
commentator's
critique
of the NFTC study, see
Reuven S. Avi-Ycnah, "Tax Competition
and Multinational
Competitiveness:
The New Balance of Subpart F - Review of
the NFTC Foreign Income Report," Tax Notes, Apr. 26, 1999,
p. 582 [hereinafter Avi- Ycnah, "Competition
and Competitiveness"). For a response to this critique, see Peter R. Merrill, "A
Response
to Professor Avi-Yortah on Subpart F," Tax Note~,
June 21, 1999, p. 802 [hereinafter
Merrill, "Response to AVlYonah"].
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The Existing

Scope of the Deferral

Privilege

current u.s. income tax (subject to the allowance of
,~ a credit for foreign income tax") is generally paid on
, income realtzed
from:
U.S. business or investment activities carried on
by. a~2individual,
corporation, LLC,l1 or partnership;
foreign business or investment activities carried
on by a foreign branch of a U.S. corporation;"
and
foreign business or investment activities carried
on by a U.S, individual or by an LtC or partnership composed of Ll.S, members or partners."
Under the doctrine of Moli"e Properties, Inc. v. Commissio"er,ls the U.s, income tax law usually regards a
foreign corporation,
whether or not controlled by U.S.
persons, as a foreign taxpayer that is legally distinct
from its shareholders."
This principle applies to any
entity (including
an LLC) classified as a foreign corporation for U.S. tax law purposes, whether under the
current "check-the-box"
entity classification system"
or under the prior I'corporate resemblance" entity classification regulations.1
Thus, except to the extent that
the Internal
Revenue Code's various
antideferral
regimes provide
otherwise, U.S. tax on foreign-source
business and investment income earned by a U.S. person through a foreign corporation, even a U.S.-taxpayercontrolled foreign corporation, I' is generally deferred
until (1) the income is repatriated to the United States
r through corporate distributions or (2) the stock is
I sold," These antidef rral regimes have different trigger

points (definition of the entity covered by the antideferral regime, types of income for which deferral is curtailed, and types of Lf.S. shareholders
for whom deferral
is curtailed) and different antideferral mechanisms (current income inclusion, characterization of the U.S. shareholder's gain from sale of stock in the entity as ordinary
income, or an interest charge on the deferred U'.S. income
tax at the time the U.S. shareholder receives a dividend
distribution from the foreign corporation or realizes gain
from a sale of the corporation's
stock), They also overlap
to some considerable extent; thus, a U.S. shareholder's
ownership interest in a foreign corporation may be subject to more than one of these antideferral regimes at the

,

\i

"Section 901(a),

"In this article,
liability company
passthrough

the abbreviation "LLC" refers to a limited
formed under U.S. law and taxed on a

basis,

"See sections

1, n, 61(a)(2), 61(a)(13), 702,864(b),864(c),

871(b), 875(1), 882.
"See sections 11, 61.(a)(2).
"See sections 1, 11, 61(a)(2), 61(a)(13), 702,
"319 U.S. 436 (1943).
USee Treas.

reg. sections 1.11-1(a),

1.881~li 1 Joseph Isen-

bergh, International Taxation 1:22 (2d ed. 1999);Joseph Weare
and M.L. Morris, "Tax System and Allocation,Methods
~ the
United States of America," in Taxation of FOreign and Natwnal
Enterprises 199,202,263 (League of Nations 1932). . '
17See Treas.

reg. sections 301.7701-1,

-2, -3, adopted

In

final

form in T.D. 8697,1997-1 CB, 215.
"See T.D. 6503,1960-2 c.s. 409; T.D. 7515,1977-2CB;,482.
19In

this

article,

such an entity

is referred to as a

con-

trolled foreign corporation" or a /lCFC."
20S Gustafson, Peroni, and Pugh, supra note 3, at 335-41.
ee
When the income is reported by the U .5. 5harehol~er as an

actual dividend
an inclusion under one of the antideferral
regimes or a de~med dividend under section 1248on ~he.sale
of a CFC's stock, the U,S. shareholder
will obtain an edita
m~lre~t
foreign tax credit for a proportionate amount .ofthe cr
e
foreign
taxes paid or accrued by the forelgn corpora~lOn
(Whichare "deemed paid" by the tr.s. shareholder at the tune
of the actual dividend income inclusion, or deemed dividend income) if the U.S. shareholder owns at least 10percent

?

'

same time."
The code's antideferral regimes, however, constitute
a weak barrier to deferral, particularly regarding active
business income. For example,
the controlled foreign
corporation
(CFC) provisions"
are the most comprehensive of these regimes.
When they apply, they
impose current U.S. tax on five categories of current
CFC income, including both active and passive items,
that are collectively referred to as subpart F income.f'
The tax is implemented by treating U.S, persons who
own at least 10 percent of the voting power of a CFC's
stock," actually or by statutory
attribution,25 as if each
had received a dividend of their pro rata shares of the
CFC's subpart F income for the year," In addition,
these same persons are also treated as receiving dividends equal to their pro rata shares of the CFC's earnings and profits that have not been previously or currently taxed to them as subpart F income and that are
invested in certain U.S. assets during the year. 27 Section
960 adds that U.S. persons
who are charged
with

of the voting stock of the foreign corporation and is either a
U.s. domestic corporation or an individual who elects under
section 962 to be taxed as a corporation with respect to the
income. Sections 902, 960. The amount of the U.S. shareholder's actual dividend, income inclusion, or deemed d ividend will be "grossed up" (that is, increased) by the amount
of the foreign corporation's foreign taxes deemed paid by the
U.S. shareholder. Section 78. The U.S. shareholder will also
receive a direct credit for any foreign tax withheld from an
actual dividend. Section 901.
21Thecode contains various rules for coordinating the ap~
plication of these regimes in light of their overlapping scope.
se« eg. sections 551(g), 951(c), (d), (I), 1293(g)(1)(A), 1297(d),
(e).

22Sections951~964, 1248. For a detailed discussion of the
subpart F proVisions, see 1 Joel D. Kuntz and Robert J. Peroni,
U.S, International Taxation ch. B3 (1992).
"Sections 951(a)(1)(A)(i), 952, Although subpart F income
is usually foreign source, see section 952(b), it is theoretically
possible for U.S.-source passive income that has been subjected to U.S. withholding tax to nevertheless be included in
subpart F income, see sections 952(b), 954(c)(1)(A); Treas. reg,
section 1.952-1(b)(2).
"Section 951(a)(1), (b).
~Section 951(b).
"Section 951(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(2).
VSections 951(a)(1)(B), 956,959; Treas. reg. section 1.959l(c) Ex.; Melvm S. Adess, Barbara M. Angus, and Keith E.
Villmow, "The Erosion of Deferral: Subpart F After the 1993
Act," 47 Tax Law. 933, 954 (1994).

(Footnote 20 continued in next coluron.)
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receipt of either of these constructive
dividends are
also entitled to an indirect credit for foreign income tax
liabilities allocable thereto, if the U'S. persons actually
own at least 10 percent of the CFC's voting stock and
if the U.S. persons are either domestic corporations or
individuals who have elected under section 962 to be
taxed as domestic corporations."
The CFC regime, however, applies only if more than
50 percent of the voting power or value of the CFC's
shares'" is owned by U.S. persons who each own at
least 10 percent
of the voting power of the CFC's
stock." Moreover, constructive dividends
of subpart F
income and amounts invested in U.S. assets are imputed only to those u.s. shareholders who own, actually or by statutory attribution, at least 10 percent of the
CFC's stock voting power.'! This means that the CFC
provisions are avoidable to the extent that U.s. persons
keep their ownership of a CFC's stock from exceeding
50 percent of the voting power or value of the outstanding shares, or to the extent that each U.S. shareholder
restricts his stock ownership to shares representing less
than 10 percent of voting power. Furthermore,
subpart
F income excludes manufacturing income" Thus, a
CFC is effectively outside the subpart F constructive
di vidend provisions to the extent that its income is
earned through selling goods of its own manufacture.
By carefully observing the stock ownership
rules
described above" or by ensuring that a CFC has only
manufacturing
income and that it avoids investments
in U.S. assets, U.S. shareholders of a CFC can, and do,
readily avoid current U.S. tax on the CFC's income.>
Section 1248 is often mentioned as included in the
code's CFC provisions.
Generally speaking,
section
1248 employs a complex set of rules to convert gain
recognized on disposition_of CFC stock from capital
pam to dividend lTI.come.3, Nevertheless, it is largely
ineffectual as an antideferral device because it does not

"Section 960(a)(I), 962(a);see also section 902.
"Section 957(a). The 50 percent threshold is lowered to 25
percent for certain foreign insurance companies by sections

953(c)and 957(b).
"Sections 951(b), 957(.).
"Section 951(a)(1).
"Freas. reg. section 1.954-3(a)(4); "Treasury's Berman
Reflects on Past and Future International Tax Law," Tax Notes,
Sept. 15, 1997, p. 1387; N.Y.St. B. Ass-n Tax Sec., "Notice
98-11: Tax Tream:ent o~ I:Iybrid E~tities:' Tax Notes, May 18,
1998, p. 877; DaVId R. TIllinghast, An Old-Timer's
Comment
on Notice 98-11," Tax Notes, Mar. 30, 1998, p. 1739.
3J~owev~r, one must caveat the indirect stock ownership
rules In section 958(a) and the constructive stock ownership
rules in section 958(b).
.34See Adess. Angus, and Villmow, supra note 27, at 935;
MI~e Coop~r, Gary Melcher, and Clint Stretch, "Suddenly
Saving Foreign Taxes Is Abusive? An Untenable Proposal"
Tax Notes tnt'i, Mar. 9, 1998, p. 779; 1 Isenbergh, supra note
16, at 1:22-~:23i see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, "The Structure
of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification," 74
Tex. 1. Rev. 1301, 1326, 1328 (1996) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah
"Proposal for Simplification"].
'
"35See Gustafson, Peroni, and Pugh, supra note 3 at 410Mll'
2 Kuntz and Peroni, supra note 22, at par. 86.03[6].
'

affect deferral's
time-value-of-money
benefit,
illustrated below."
The foreign personal holding company (FPHC) provisions'" are an additional antideferral regime. They
tax Ll.S. persons who are shareholders
of an FPHC as
if they had received current pro rata distributions of
the company's undistributed
foreign personal holding
company
income (basically, the corporation's worldwide taxable income, with certain adjustments) for the
year.38 However, a foreign corporation is not an FPHC
unless initially 60 percent or more of its annual gross
income is comprised of certain types of passive or personal service income." This benchmark generally
drops to 50 percent for years after the first year of
qualification as an FPHC.'o Thus, the FPHC provisions
are generally avoided if the foreign corporation
has
predominantly
active business
income. Moreover,
these provisions require that at some time during the
tax year, more than 50 percent of the voting power or
value of the foreign corporation's stock must have been
owned, directly or indirectly, by five or fewer individuals who were U'.S. citizens or residents.f
This
stock ownership requirement
provides an easy path to
avoidance of the FPHC provisions.
Yet another anti deferral
regime is found in the
foreign investment company provisions." If they
apply, a U.S. shareholder who disposes of stock must
treat any gain as ordinary to the extent of the share-

6
3 See
infra text accompanying notes 57-66. Moreover, section 1248's "deemed dividend" treatment of all or a part of a
U.S. shareholder's gain from the sale of a Cl'C's stock actually
provides a tax benefit to a U.5. corporate shareholder of the
CFC that owns at least 10 percent of the CFe's voting stock,
because the deemed dividend will carry an indirect foreign
tax credit under section 902 for a proportionate amount of the
Cf'C's foreign taxes "deemed paid" by the U.S. corporate
shareholder on account of the deemed dividend. In addition,
realization of dividend income under section 1248 on the sale
or liquidation of a CFC's stock often has the advantage of
avoiding the foreign withholding tax imposed on actual dividends because gain on a sale of stock or liquidation of a
corporation
often is exempt from a foreign country's withholding tax. Thus, a corporate shareholder often prefers dividend treatment under section 1248 to sale treatment, particularly
in the absence of a capital gain preference for
corporate taxpayers under current law, see Gustafson, Peroni,
and Pugh, supra note 3, at 410-11, as well as possible U.S.source treatment of most gain, see section 865(a); but see section

865(f), (h)(10).
"Sections 551M558.For a detailed
provisions,

see 1 Kuntz and Peroni,

discussion of the FPHC
supra note 22, at par.

B2.06.
"Section 551(b). Undistributed
foreign personal holding
company income is the taxable income of the FPHC subject
to certain adjustments. Section 556(a). A U.S. shareholder
increases ~t~ tax basis in the shares by the amount of the
deemed dividend. Section 551(e).

"Sections 552(.)(1), 553(a).
"Section 552(a)(1).
"Section 552(a)(2).
<USections 1246·1247. For a detailed
foreig~ investment company provisions,
Peroni. supra note 22, at par. B2.07.

discussion of the
see 1 Kuntz and
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holder's pro rata share of the foreign corgoration's
earnings and profits accumulated after 1962. 3 Like sec" tion 1248, these provisions are a rather feeble attack on
, deferral because they only deal with the character of
gain and not the time-value-of
money advantage
derived from deferral. Furthermore, they require that
the foreign corporation be registered under the Investment Company
Act of 1940 as either a management
company or a unit investment trust, or that it be
primaril y engaged in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading In securities or commodities." Corporations predominantly
engaged in active commercial operations outside the securities or commodities
business are not covered. Furthermore, the foreign investment company provisions are inapplicable unless
at least 50 percent of the vote or value of the foreign
corporation's
stock is owned by U.S. persons's This
provides a ready escape from the foreign investment

company provisions."

The code's antideferral regimes
constitute a weak barrier to deferral,
particularly regarding active business
income.
A final antideferral regime is found in the passive
foreign investment
company (PFIC) provisions."
Generally
speaking,
this regime attacks deferral
through a complex offsetting interest charge mechanism applied at the shareholder level." Its coverage IS
quite broad in two important respects - ItSantideferral mechanism applies to any U.s. person that owns
stock in a foreign corporation that meets the definition
of a PFIC no matter how small that shareholder's
ownership interest in the corporation, and the definition of a PFIC does not depend on any degree of con-

"Section 1246(a).
"Section 1246(b)(2).
"Section 1246(b).
46See 2 Isenbergh, supra note 16, at 43:3.
"
"Sections 1291-1297'see gellerally Thomas D. Fuller, The
.
Pfickls
Finger of Fate: '.Many Questions. FA"
ew ns~ersl Tax
Noles, Nov. 16, 1998, p, 879 Por a detailed diSCUSSIOn
~~ t~~
PFIC provisions, see 1 Kuntz and Peroni, supra note ,
par. 62.08.
h
"Section 1291(a); see also Gustafson, Peroni, and .Pug. '
SUpra note 3 at 429-30 There are also elective altern~tIves 1~
theform of ~ passthrough regime for a qualified electmg f~n
(QEF), section ]293 and ~ mark-to-market regi~e, secti°bn
'
. lnf ationmust
et
1296.To make the QEFelection,
certain 1 orm
I
Supplied by the fund. Non-U.S. managed fund~arere uct:~
to cornrni t to provide the fund-level informationnec~ss. y
to make a QEF election, but wiIJ do so if they are,
the fund to U S individual investors who are eligi ital .
' .
.
d
ntthe capita gam
pref erential tax rateon capital gams an w,aIon -term capital
~tential rob, f1o,W-through treatment accorded the qEF.5
gainS. Obtaining entity-level informatIon 15 a.p
Pt in_
Ie
.
requlreS curren
m Whenever an antideferral regrme
f non-V S ~
elusionby a U.5, shareholder of the income °te~ when th~
b
~hntrolled foreign corporation ~ndis e~ac~~e
:orporation,
areholder owns only a small mterest 10
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centrated ownership by U.S. persons of stock in the
corporation. The PFIC regime, however, is inapplicable
to foreign corporations predominantly
engaged in active business operations because it applies only if a
corporation's annual gross income is at least 75 percent
passive, or at least 50 percent of the average value (or,
in specified circumstances, adjusted basis) of the corpotation's assets held during the year produced passive income or were held for the production of passrve
income." A foreign corporation that meets the definitions of both a CFC and a PFIC, however, is not treated
as a PFlC with respect to a u.s. person owning stock
in the corpora lion who meets the definition of a 10
percent-or-more "United States shareholder" in section
951(b), thus eliminating this overlap between the CFC
and PFlC regimes.50 Following the repeal in 1996 of the
excess passive asset rules of former section 956A, the
PFIC 50 percent passive asset test was the only aggregate limitation on a CFC's ability to accumulate
earnings not taxed by the United States. The ehrrunation of the CFC/PFIC overlap has freed CFCs to defer
indefinitely Ll.S. tax on unlimited amounts of lowtaxed foreign-sQurce earnings.
As demonstrated by the preceding discussion,
the
Internal Revenue Code's antideferral provisions do not
reach substantial amounts of low-taxed foreign-source
earnings, if for example, the foreign corporation has
substantial active business income or its Ll.S, ownership is below applicable thresholds. In short, the antideferral regimes are substantially avoidable barriers to
achieving deferral of U.S. tax on foreign business income of foreign corporations
controlled by U.S. shareholders."
The Incongruity

of Elective Deferral

Various proponents of the deferral privilege, including in particular the authors
of the NFTC study,
describe the general availability
of deferral as representing a balance between (1) a concern for the ability
of u.s. businesses to compete in foreign markets and
(2) protection of the U.S. tax base and, perhaps, the goal
of promoting worldwide economic well-being through
the principle of capital
export neutrality"
To be
specific, the general availability
of deferral for CFC
income reduces the effective rate of U.S. tax on foreignsource income. This outcome is said to make U.S. con-

1
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I
"Section 1297(.).
"Section 1297(e), added by Pub. 1. No. 105-34, section
1175, 111 Stat. 788, 990-93 (1997).
51 See generally
Gustafson, Peroni, and Pugh, supra note 3,
at 355-41;Staff of Joint Cormn. on Tax'n, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess., General Explanation of the TaxReform Act of 1986, at
1021-22(1987).
52See NFfe Study, supra note 2, at viii-x, 2-21, 5-1, 6-1, 6-28.
This "balance"characterization appears in the legislative history of subpart F, seeH.R. Rep. No. 1447,87th Congo 2d Sess.
(1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 40S, 461-62;S. Rep. No. 1861,
87th Cong.,2d Sess. (1962), reprinted ill 1962-3 CB. 702, 789,
and is often repeated in Treasury documents, see, e.g., U.S.
Treas. Dep't, "International Tax Reform:An Interim Report"
7-8 (1993)[hereinafter "U.S. Treas. Dep't, Interim Rep"].
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trolled businesses more competitive in low-tax foreign
jurisdictions vis-a-vis foreign-controlled corporations
whose home countries either impose no home country
tax on income earned outside their borders or permit
deferral of home country tax until the income is
repatriated from the low-tax jurisdiction.
In the limited circumstances when subpart F or the
other deferral
regimes strip away the deferral
privilege, unprivileged foreign-source income is subject to current U.S. tax as if it had been earned in the
United States. Therefore, U.S. taxation becomes a
neutral factor in the decision of a u.s. taxpayer to locate
the unprivileged
income-generating
operations in
either the United States or abroad - a result that effectuates the principle of capital export neutrality as
well as protecting residence-based taxation. Thus, this
elective deferral, tempered by anti deferral limitations,
is often characterized as balancing international competitiveness objectives against a concern for capital export neutrality.
Arguably, however, the code's overall structure
strikes a different balance regarding the taxation of
foreign-source income earned by u.s. persons and the
general rule of CFC income deferral represents a
dramatic departure
from this larger balance. To be
specific, since 1913, the code has provided that all U.S.
domestic taxpayers, individual and corporate, are taxable on their worldwide income, including
their
foreign-source earnings. The 1913 language expressed
this point by imposing the tax on "gains or profits and
income derived from any source whatever. u53 The current
statutory language is "all income from whatever source
derived."!'

The 1918 credit was limited to the U.S.
tax on a domestic taxpayer's
foreign-source income and this
limitation, with many additional layers
of complexity, persists today.
Of ~ourse the countries in which foreign-source inc0.r:neISearned assert a right to impose their own levies.
ThISmeans that the U.S. tax on foreign-source income
of U.S. persons is effectively a second layer of taxation
that wo:uld, 111 the absence of mitigation, cause foreignsource I.ncome to .be much more heavily burdened than
dom~stic-sourc~ income. The U~ted States responded
to this problem m 1918 by adopting a foreign tax credit,
which allows a U.S. ]Jerson to take a credit against her
Ll.S.Income tax liability for qualifying foreign taxes.
But if this credit had been allowed, without limitation,
in the full amount of a U.S. resident's foreign tax
liability, the U.S. person who earned income in a
country with income tax rates greater than U.s. rates
could have used the excess of her foreign tax payments

"Act of ~ctober 3, 1913, Ch. 16, Section IT.B., 38 Stat. 114
167 (emphasis added).
'
"Section 61(a).

over the U.S. tax on her foreign-source income to offset
U.S. tax on her domestic-source income. If this were
permitted, foreign countries could adopt very high
rates of tax and feel secure in the knowledge that the
excess tax on Americans would actually be funded out
of the U.S. Treasury in the form of forgone U'.S. tax on
U.S.-source income. To prevent this result, the 1918
credit was limited to the U.S. tax on a domestic taxpayer's foreign~source income and this limitation, with
many additional layers of complexity, persists today.55
This U.S. tax structure, consisting of a current levy
on domestic taxpayers' income "from whatever source
derived," but mitigated by a foreign tax credit limited
to the U.S. tax on foreign-source income, achieves a
balance of multiple competing factors. First, it balances
the claim of the United States to a current tax on
foreign-source
income of its residents against the
legitimate taxing claims of the source countries with
respect to that income; but in turn, this structure also
balances the source country taxing claims against the
legitimate U'S. interest in preventing foreign governments from raiding the U.S. Treasury to finance their
operations and programs. The general structure that
emerges from this balance is that foreign-source income of U.S. persons is subject to current u.s. tax except to the extent that a foreign creditable tax offsets
the U.S. tax.
When the U.S. tax structure is understood in these
terms, the elective deferral of U.s. tax on a U.S. CFC's
foreign-source income, even when the foreign country
imposes little or no tax of its own, stands out as a
startling incongruity. Of course, a deferral proponent
will point out that this deferral flows naturally from
another structural aspect of the code - C corporations
are generally regarded as legally distinct from their
shareholders
and, therefore, as separate taxpayers.
When the C corporation is a foreign taxpayer with only
f?relgn Incom~, the restrictions imposed on the definihan of a foreign corporation's
gross income by the
Internal Revenue Code lead inexorably to the result
that no current U.S. tax is payable on the foreign income by the foreign C corporation. The reason is that
fore.ign corporations incur U.S. tax only on income effectIvely connected with a trade or business conducted
within the United States and on certain u.s.-source
investment income.P
~oreover, no current income tax is payable on the
foreign C corporation's income by its U.S. shareholders
because the shareholders and the corporation are legally dl~tmct and the income was earned by the latter. The
code s larger. pattern, however, requires U.S. business
owners and investors to pay current U.S. tax on their
realized income "from whatever source derived" unless the income is earned through a C corporation. But
In tha t case, the realized income
from whatever source
derived" is subjected to a current U.S. tax at the corp 0U

SSSee section 904.
S6See
~ection 882(b) (limiting gross income of a foreign
corp or ation ,to U.S.-source income and income effectively
connected WIth a U.S. trade or business); see also NFTC study,
supra note 2, at vii.
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rate level, except for foreign-s~urce income of a foreign
C corporation.
Thus, the code s exception for realized
.71 foreign-source mcome earned by Ll.S, persons through
a controlled foreign C corporation also appears incongruOUSwhen viewed in comparison to the general tax
treatment of business owners and investors.

.t

Exploring

the Substance

of the Deferral

Privilege

As discussed
above, the deferral
of U.S. tax on
foreign-source income of a foreign corporation controlled by U.S. taxpayers provides an incentive for U.S.
taxpayers to carryon business and investments in lowtax countries
through CFCS57 The following example
is one approach
to demonstrating
the operation of this
incentive.
Assume that Ll.S, Corp., taxed under section 11 at
35 percent, earns $100 of taxable income from branch
operations in a foreign country that imposes a 10 percent income tax but no branch profits tax or dividend

Withholding tax." u.S. Corp. would currently incur a
net 25 percent U.S. tax (35 percent U.s. tax minus
a
section 901 direct foreign tax credit for the 10 percent
foreign tax).
But if Il.S. Corp. carries on its foreign operations
through a wholly owned foreign subsidiary, and if the
antideferral provisions are inapplicable, the 25 percent
net U.S. tax (35 percent U.S. tax minus a section 902
indirect foreign tax credit) on the subsidiary's $100 of
taxable income is deferred
until the subsidiary's
income (grossed up under section 78) is distributed
to
U.S. Corp. or until U.S. Corp. sells the subsidiary's
stock. During the deferral period, U.S. Corp. has the
interest-free use of the $25 of deferred tax and is, therefore, commonly described
as the beneficiary of a $25
interest-free loan from the u.S. Treasury." The following table shows two ways of illustrating the value of
this benefit:"
Deferral
Period

U.S. Corp.'s Total
Avoided Interest
Expense on $25
(10% After-Tax

57U.5. Treas. Dep't, Interim Rep., supra note 52, at 7. In
overall terms, the deferral subsidy may be quite large. To be
specific, the tax expenditures chapter of the Clinton administration's 1999 fiscal year budget estimated that the fiscal1999
revenue loss from deferral would be $2.6 billion, and that as

.,
,~
,
.

a result, deferral would rank as the 29th largest of 115 fiscal
1999 tax expenditures.
See "Tax Expenditures Chapter From
the President's Fiscal 1999 Budget," Tax Notes, Feb. 16, 1998,
P: 911at 912, 925-27. Some commentators have disputed this,
however. They have argued that if deferral were eliminated,
CFe losses would become deductible by U.s. shareholders
and, in addition, the excess foreign tax credits of many U.S.
corporations would become usable against current U.S.tax on
CFe income. They assert that as a result of these two developments,little revenue would be gained from ending deferral.
See Frisch, supra note 7, at 585-86; LaBrenda Garrett-Nelson,
"The Future of Deferral," in Taxing America 239 (Karen B.
Brownand Mary Louise Fellows eds. 1996)i Oosterhuis and
Cutrone, supra note 7, at 767-68; Shay, supra note 7, at 1061;
U.S. Treas. Dep't, Interim Rep., supra note 52, at 10; see also
Kathleen Matthews "How Should Clinton Handle InternationalTax Issues? ,: Tax Notes Nov. 16, 1992, p. 985 at 986;
"Roundtable Disc~ssion _ In'ternational Taxation: D. Kevin
Dolan,Stephen E. Shay, and David R. Tillinghast:' ABA Sec.
?!Tax'nNewsletter, PaI11993, at 8. Under this view, the precedLng revenue loss estimate may be substantially overstated.
~evertheless, any restriction on the ability electively to defer
mcomeor take losses into account currently may bepres~ed
:0 raiserevenue. But regardless of how this empiricalquestion
IS resolved, the deferral privilege clearly encourages ~.s.taxpayersto carryon business operations through CFCs in lo~taxforeign countries if the taxpayer~ anticipate th~t ~heyWIll
notbe In an excess foreign tax credit status Indefinitely and
thatthe foreign operations will be profitable. Thus, th~se w~o
areprimarily concerned with capital export neutralIty will
~avor ending deferral regardless of wh~ther the re~enue
-, Consequence to the Treasury is a large gam, a small gam, or
a loss. See Reuven S, Avl-Yonah. "The Logic of SubpartF: ~
Cornparative Perspective" Tax Notes, June 29, 1998,p. 1775,
Shay,SUpra note 7, at 1061;1063;Statement of StanfordG. Ross
~nGeneral Tax Reform, pt. 11, 1720, 1724-25, 93d Cong., 1st
'55. (COmm. Print 1973).
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5 vears
20 vears

Interest Rate)
$15.26
$143.19

U.S. Corp.'s Year 1

Cost of $25
Deferred Tax
(10% Discount Rate)
$15.52
$3.72

Although the preceding
interest-free loan analysis
is the usual method for illustrating
the effect of deferral, it is arguably more accurate to describe deferral as
a system by which U.S. shareholders
compel the Treasury to invest in their CFCs. This is because the amount
the Treasury can lose is not a fixed rate of forgone
interest but is, instead, a variable amount that is dependent on the CFC's business
fortunes during
the
deferral period. Moreover, if things go well during the
deferral period, the Treasury can actually have a gain
that is analogous to an equity investor's variable rate
of return instead of a lender's
fixed rate of return. To
illustrate these points, assume again that Ll.S. Corp., a
35 percent bracket U.S. taxpayer, is the sale shareholder
of a CFC operating in a foreign country that imposes
a 10 percent income tax but no dividend withholding
tax. The CFC earns $100 of net business profits on the
last day of year 1 but does not distribute this amount
until the end of year 2. If the CFC were a branch of a
domestic corporation, the u.s. Treasury would be entitled to a $25 net tax for year 1 (35 percent U.S. tax
minus a section 901 direct credit for the 10 percent

58lf a branch profits tax or dividend withholding tax were
imposed, it would likely result in a section 901 direct credit
as an "in lieu of" tax under section 903. Thus, to simplify this
and succeeding examples, we assume that the foreign country
does not impose these taxes.
59See Gustafson, Peroni, and Pugh, supra note 3, at 337;
1
Isenbergh, supra note 16, at 1:22; see also Green, supra note 7,
at 34 (1993).
'"See gellerally Joseph M. Dodge, J. Clifton Fleming, Ir., and
Deborah A. Geter, Federal Income Tax: Doctrine Structure and
Policy 467-70(2d ed. 1999).
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foreign tax). But under the nonheroic assumption that
the US antideferral regimes are avoided, the CFC is
free to invest this $25 during year 2 as part of the $90
year 1 revenue that it retains after paying the $10 year
1 foreign tax. If the CFC loses half of this $90, carries
back the loss to receive a $4.50 refund of foreign tax,
and distributes only $49.50 ($45 earnings and $4.50
refunded foreign tax) to Ll.S.Corp. at the dose of year
2, the distribution will be grossed up under section 78
to $55 ($49.50 cash distribution + $5.50 previously paid
foreign tax). A 35 percent US tax thereon in the
amount of $19.25 will be tentatively due to the Ll.S.
Treasury, but after allowing an indirect credit of $5.50
for the foreign tax, only $13.75 (after application of the
foreign tax credit) will be paid to the U.S. Treasury.
Because of the CFC's year 2 loss, the Treasury's tax
collection has been cut from $25 to $13.75; thus, the
Treasury has shared in the CFC's loss just like an equity
investor,"

The elective deferral of U.S. tax on a
U.S. CFC's foreign-source income,
even when the foreign country
imposes little or no tax of its own,
stands out as a startling incongruity.
The Treasury's tax collection, however, is $13.75 instead of the $12.50 (one-half of $25) that one would
intuitively expect in view of the fact that one-half of
the Treasury's $25 "investment" was lost during year
2. How do we account for the extra $1.25 collected by
the Treasury? This is exactly equal to the Treasury's
$12.50 year 2 loss multiplied by the 10 percent foreign
tax rate. In other words, the Treasury has effectively
realized a $1.25 foreign tax saving just as any nongovernmental equity investor would if it deducted a
$12.50 investment loss from income otherwise taxable
at a 10 percent rate.
Of course, if the CFC doubled its money to $180
during year 2 (a $90 gain), paid a $9 foreign tax on the
gam at the end of year 2 and then distributed $171 ($180
- $9) to UiS. Corp., the distribution would be grossed
up to $190 ($171 + $10 + $9) and the US Treasury
would collect a net 25 percent tax of $47.50 instead of
$25; in other words, the Treasury would take a share
of the CFC's 'year 2 profit just like an equity investor.
But m this gam scenano, why is the U.s. tax only $47.50
Instead of $50? The reason is that when the $25 that
wasthe Treasury's share of the CFC's year 1 retained
profits doubled to $50, thus producing a $25 gain for
the Treasury: the foreign government took 10 percent
($2.50) of this gam as tax, Just as if the Treasury were

"The Treasury's $11.25 loss is different from the loss it
suffers when a domestic corporation claims a net operating
loss carrybac~ deduction. This is because the Treasury has
usually had irrterest-free discretionary use of the refund
generated by the carryback deduction (see section 6611(f)(1),
(4)), whereas the Treasury never had discretionary use of th
$11.25 that it lost in the CFC scenario.
e

844

a nongovernmental
investor. This left the Treasury
with a net gain of $22.50 that, when added to the Treasury's initial $25 "investment,"
yielded $47.50 - the
amount of the Treasury's year 2 tax collection. As the
preceding gain and loss scenarios both illustrate, instead of viewing deferral as providing US shareholders with an interest-free loan, it is arguably better
to think of deferral as a means by which U.S. shareholders cause the Ll.S. Treasury to provide equity capital for their CFCs·2
There is also an alternative approach for analyzing
deferral that draws on an insight commonly used in
analyzing consumption tax regimes. This insight holds
that if tax rates remain constant, allowing a deduction
for the cost of an investment but then taxing all returns
thereon (including recovery of basis or principal) is
generally equivalent to disallowing a deduction for the
investment's cost but then excluding all returns thereon from the tax base.63 When this insight is applied to
CFCs, it reveals that deferral of tax on a CFC's retained
income (which is equivalent
to allowing a current
deduction for the cost of investments made by the CFC
out of that income) effectively treats the CFC as if a
current U.S. tax were paid on the retained income but
the CFC were then allowed a U.S. tax exemption for all
returns from investing its after-tax retained income.
To demonstrate this proposition, assume, as above,
that U.S. Corp., a 35 percent bracket U.S. taxpayer, has
a wholly owned CFC that earns $100 of net income
from operations in a foreign country imposing a 10
percent income tax and no dividend withholding tax
and that none of the U.s. antideferral provisions apply.
All of the CFC's year 1 earnings occur at year-end and
are distributed by the CFC to US Corp. at the dose of
year 2. During the 12-month deferral period, the CFC
invests its $90 of retained earnings (after payment of
the $10 foreign tax) at a 10 percent per annum pretax
rate of return. The investment earns $9 ($90 x 0.10) and
at the close of year 2, the CFC pays a $0.90 foreign tax
thereon and distributes $98.10 ($90 + $9 - $0.90) to U.S.

62
0£ course, in the gain scenario, the Treasury is compensated for the risk that it undertakes. The point, however, is
that the variable rate of gain and the loss exposure mean that
the Treasury's position is different from an interest-free lender
and is like an equity investor.
63See, e.g., William D. Andrews,
"A Consumption-Type or
Cash Flow Personal Income Tax," 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1113, 1126,

1150 (1974); J. Clifton Fleming,

Jr., "The Deceptively Dis-

parate Treatment of Business and Investment Interest Expense Under a Cash-Flow Consumption
Tax and a Schanz-

Haig-Slmons IncomeTax," 3 Fla. Tax. Rev. 544,552-54 (1997);
U.S. Treas. Dep't, "Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform" 123
(1977). However, for a discussion of the conditions that must
exist for these equivalent results to occur, see ABA Sec. of
Tax'n Comm. on Simplification,
"Complexity and the Per-

sonal Consumption Tax," 35 Tax Law. 415, 418, 425 (1982);
1:1ichael ~; Graetz, "Implementing

tion Tax,
Warren,

a Progressive Consump-

92 Ham L. Rev. 1575, 1601-02 (1979); Alvin C.

[r., "Accelerated Capital

Recovery

Debt, and Tax

Arb,~trage," 38 Tax Law. 549, 551-52 (1985);Alvin C. Warren,
[r., How

Much Capital Income Taxed Under an Income Tax

Is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?" 52 Tax L Rev. 1 (1996).
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shareholders. Moreover, as discussed above, the earn-

Corp.This amount is grossed up to $109 under section
78 ($98.10 + $10 + $0.90), a 25 percent U.s. tax in the
II. amount of $27.25 is paid thereon after credit for the
., foreigntax ($109 x 0.25 = $27.25), and U.S. Corp. has
. $70.85left ($98.10 distribution - $27.25 U.S. tax).
Now assume a radically different Ll.S, tax regime in
whichthere is no deferral of the 35 percent U.S.tax on
theCFC's business profits but there is also no U.S. tax
onearnings produced by the CFC's investment of those
profits, not even :when the eamin!?s are distributed to
U.s.Corp. as dividends. Under this regime, the CFC's
$100of business profits will bear a full 35 percent combined Ll.S. and foreign tax at the end of year 1 (10
percentforeign tax plus 25 percent U.S. tax after crediting the foreign tax). The CFC will then have only $65
toinvest at 10 percent during year 2. The CFCwill earn
$6.50 on this amount, pay a 10 percent foreign tax of
$0.65,pay no U.S. tax, and have $70.85 left for distributionto U.S. Corp. at the end of year 2 ($65 principal +
$6.50 earnings
- $0.65 foreign tax). Under the
parameters of our assumed tax regime, no U.S.tax will
bedue on the distribution and U.S. Corp. will wind up
with $70.85. This is exactly the same as U.S. Corp's
ending amount when we assumed above that the applicable U.s. taxing regime deferred U.S. tax on the
Cf'C's income until it was repatriated but then taxed
both the business profits and the investment earnings
thereon. In other words, the existing Ll.S. deferral
regime reaches the same result as the hypothetical
. regime under which the CFC's retained business
'/l profits are currently taxed but there is never a U'.S. tax
on the CFe's earnings from investing those profits.

ings yield an equity-based

Flaws in the Operation

investor, or a regime for

,

1. Retention and reinvestment

is an example of this case.68
4. Because the benefit of deferral increases to the

degree that repatriation of CFC income is delayed, U.s.
taxpayers that can afford to postpone repatriation are
favored over those that cannot. The competitiveness
argument, which forms the core of the NFTC study'S
case for deferral, does not support this result.

t

I

tax WO~yld
i~5ta1S~~X

"nposed by the foreign jurisdiction. See genera
Per~ni, and Pugh, supra note 3, at 14-17, 223.
See section 103.

of earnings by the

CFC are encouraged even though the CFC's U.S. shareholders might be able to invest its earnings in the
United States at higher before-tax rates of return than
are obtainable by the CFe.
2. Deferral is fully available without regard
to
whether the U.S. taxpayer has little competition in the
foreign country (say a pharmaceutical company selling
patent-protected drugs?") or faces fierce competition.
3. Deferral is fully available even if the U.S. taxpayer's principal competitor in a particular foreign
country is another U.S. taxpayer. The struggle in
foreign markets between U.S. software manufacturers

I

Thus, the only applicable

is

linked to the rationale of making U.S. businesses more
competitive in foreign markets. To be specific:

•
.
J'f' tion." supra note
34 See Avi-Yonah ' "Proposal for Simp. J leathI UnitedStates
Under an exemption
regime- ee even w hen
w at 1325.
.
.'
an it
t
culd impose no tax on foreign-source incom
th
~srepatriated.

the deferral privilege

clearly a substantial tax incentive that is not made
available for earnings from domestic operations. Moreover, it operates in ways that are erratic and poorly

The deferral privilege is clearly a
substantial tax Incentive that Is not
made available for earnings from
domestic operations.

-

achieving tax-free reinvest-

ment of retained earnings),

Thus, if U.S. tax on CPC income is deferred until the
income is distributed to U.S. shareholders, the CPC IS
effectively permitted to receive a return O!' investments
ofthose earnings during the deferral period that IS free
of U.S. tax forever. This means that deferral creates af'
exemption regime for the investment return on a CFC s
retained earnings." It also means that WIthrespect to
a CFC's retained earnings, deferral allows the CFC to
function for its U.S. shareholders as If It were a ~ectlOn
103 tax-.exempt bond fund." But unlike the section 10~
exemphon, the effective exemphOn for the mvestmen
return on the CFC's retained earnings does not inure
to the benefit of a U.S. state or local governm~n\J~stead, the exemption is captured by the CFCs .'

~

of the Deferral Privilege

Regardless of which of the preceding analytical approaches is used to describe deferral (an interest-free
loan, a device to make the Ll.S, Treasury a forced equity

J'

I

instead of a fixed income-

based return."

'

66Wespeculate that the pretax equity-based return for CFCs
would be higher than for a comparable investment conducted
through a foreign branch
because deferral is elective
(by
making the choice to use a foreign business entity taxable for
U.S. purposes as a corporation)
and, to the extent the CFC
engages in related-party transactions,
there is an incentive
at
the margin to shift income to the lower-taxed entity. Because
U.S. transfer pricing regulations
acknowledge that a range of
prices may be considered
to be arm's length, see Treas , reg.
section 1.482~1(e), it is possible
for such income shifting
to
occur without running afoul of the section 482 transfer pricing
rules. Moreover, to the extent U.S. income that otherwise
would be subject to current U.S. taxation is shifted to a CFC
and is eligible for deferral, U.S. revenue loss will result.
67Another example is those markets where Coca-Cola
has
established an overwhelming
competitive position.
See, e.g.,
Nikhil Decgun, "Australia
Blocks Coke's Bid to Purchase
Brands of Cadbury Schweppes There," Wall St. f., Apr. 9,
1999, P: A3; BrandonMitchener and BetsyMcKay, "ED Raids
Coca-Cola'sOffices in Four Countries," Wall St. J., July 22,
1999, at A4.
6SAnother prominent example is the battle between
CocaCola and Pepsi for dominance
in some foreign markets.
See
e.g., Miriam Jordan, "Debut of Rival Diet Colas in lndi~
Leaves a Bitter Taste," Wall St. I., July 21, 1999, at Bl.

845
TAl( NOTES, February 7, 2000

COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT

5. Delerral is lully available regardless 01 the degree
to which the CFC's U.S. shareholders are, or are not,
adversely affected by the foreign tax credit limitation,
the interest allocation rules, and other elements of the
Il.S. tax system that proponents 01 delerral believe discriminate against foreign-source income.
6. The availability, and degree 01beriefit from, deferral is unrelated to whether the United States has a
foreign policy or economic assistance objective that is
lurthered by having the U.S. taxpayer operate in a
particular country,"

It is useful to ask whether the deferral
privilege would have ever come into
U.S. law if it had been directly
proposed as any of its economic
analogs.
At this point, it is uselulto ask whether the delerral
privilege would have ever come into U.S. law il it had
been directly proposed as any of its economic analogs
- that is, as either (1) a program of unlimited interestfree loans made wholly at the demand 01 private U.S.
investors, but only to finance foreign operations, (2) a
program under which private U.S. investors could
compel the U.S. Treasury to take nonvoting
equity
stakes in foreign, but not domestic, business ventures
with the business type and location being selected
wholly by the LfS. investor," or (3) the creation of a
class of offshore investment vehicles featuring tax-free
reinvestment of earnings. Surely the prospects for congressional enactment of any of these programs would
have been highly doubtful, particularly
when they
would have had the troubling ellects and characteristics described above. Since the deferral privilege
would be unacceptable
il ollered lor congressional
enactment in the form of any of its economic analogs,
it seems difficult to justify in its current form.
Even if one accepts the premise that the United
States should provide U.S, multinationals
with a subsidy for foreign investment to enhance their competitiveness in the global economy, it is inappropriate
to
effect that subsidy through a tax prelerence that is so
poorly correlated with the competitiveness
goal as is
the delerral privilege. Tax expenditure analysis supports the conclusion that tax subsidies are generally
less effective than direct government grants and have

monitoring
penditures
privilege.

problems." Traditional critiques of tax exapply with equal lorce to the delerral

Transfer Pricing Rules & the Antideferral
Regimes
One 01 the importantlunctions
01 subpart F and the
other antideferral regimes is to serve as a backstop to
the section 482 rules on intercompany pricing as they
apply to outbound transactions.
The NFTC as well as
other proponents 01 delerral argue that "transfer pricing law and administration have undergone profound
changes that call into serious question the continued
relevance of subpart F to transfer pricing enforcement. "72 We respectlully disagree.
The arm's-length standard, as interpreted in the current regulations under section 482, allows a taxpayer
to use a range 01 prices and still be treated as in full
compliance with the transfer pricing rules." This approach to applying the arm's-length
standard leaves
ample room lor U.S. corporations to shift income at the
margin to foreign subsidiaries in low-tax foreign jurisdictions under the protection of the section 482 regulations.
Moreover, recent studies suggest that, notwithstanding the improvements in transler pricing law and administration, revenue losses due to transfer pricing
may be substantial." Accordingly, antidelerrallimitations continue to be an important backstop to enforcement 01 the transler pricing rules.
Finally, even if transler prices are set in total harmony with prices in comparable uncontrolled transactions, the delerral privilege is still objectionable lor the
reasons given in parts III and IV above. Thus, developments under section 482 do not justily any loosening
01 the antidelerral limitations.
Indeed, a major advantage 01 our passthrough proposal lor dealing with

71 See generally Stanley S. Surrey, "Tax Incentives as a Device
for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison With
Direct Government Expenditures," 83 Harv. L. Rev. 704 (1970);
Stanley S. Surrey and Paul R. McDaniel, "The Tax Expenditure
Concept: Current Developments
and Emerging Issues," 20

B.C.L. Rev. 225(1979).
12NFTC Study, supra note 2, at 3-7.
73See Treas. reg. section 1.482-1(e); see also supra note 66.
74 See, e-g-, MichaelM. Phillips, "Taking Shelter As Congress Ponders New Tax Breaks, Firms Already Find Plenty,"

Wall St. f., Aug. 4, 1999,at A1, A8; Mitchell J. Tropin, "U.S.
69 p: member of the NFTC Study Drafting Group, Peter R.
Merrill, has recently conceded that the deferral privilege cannot be reformed to address the second of the above defects
and this concession seems equally applicable to all of the
above six points. See Merrill, "Response to Avi- Ycnah," supra
note 9, at 1804.

70ltis true that a domestic deferral incentive, such as accelerated depreciation
or nondeductible individual
retirement accounts, has similar attributes. This observation was
made by a participant at an International Tax Policy Forum
meeting in Washington, D.C. on September 8, 1999,

Lost Estimated $35.6 Billion in 1998 Due to Abnormal Transfer Pricing, Study Says," OTR, G-2-G-3 (june 1, 1999) (discussing study prepared by Professors Simon J. Pak and John
S. Zdanowicz); see also, e.g., IRS, "Report on the Applica tion
and Administration 01 Section 482" ch. 1 (Apr. 21, 1999) (estimates annual gross tax shortfall due to improper transfer
pricing is $2.8 billion, although IRS noted a number of upward and downward biases in the estimate); cj. "GAO, Tax
Administration:
Foreign- and U.S.-Controlled Corporations

That Did Not Pay U.S. Income Taxes," 1989-95(GAO/GGD99-39~ (indicati~g that the majority of large international corporations, foreign- and U.s-controlled,
paid no U.S. income

tax in 1989 through 1995).
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the deferral privilege, discussed below in part VII of
this article, is that it would, if adopted, significantly
take pressure
off the transfer pricing rules by substantially reducing
the i~centive for U.S. multinationals to
shift income
to their foreign subsidiaries
in low-tax
foreign jurisdictions.
Portfolio

Investment

The NFTC study argues that subpart F's limitations
on deferral cannot effectively enforce the capital export
neutrali ty principle."
This is because subpart F does
not apply to portfolio investments by U.S. residents in
the shares of foreign corporations
that enjoy zero, or
minimal, home country taxes on earnings from low-tax
jurisdictions.76 This point is correct, and in the next part
of this article, we advance a passthrough proposal that
wouid partially
ameliorate this defect in the antideferral regimes
by imposing current U.S. tax on foreign
portfolio investments by Ll.S, persons.
Our Passthrough

Proposal"

As discussed
above, the complex array of antideferof current law represents an uneasy and
flawed compromise
between completely ending deferral of U'.S. tax on income earned by Il.S. persons
through foreign corpora tions and allowing such deferral without
limitation. Congress has made numerous
revisions to the antideferral regimes over the years and
']~ has changed
directions
several
times .in terms of
, strengthening
or weakening
those. regimes. These
revisions have only made the Ll.S ', international
tax
system more complex without slgntflcantlyelmunating the problems caused by the deferrai privilege. The
end product of this legislative ineffecti~eness IS a highiy complicated
set of statutory provISIOns that lea:es
the deferral
subsidy largely intact: thus encouragmg
U.S. taxpayers to shift their operatIOns abroad to lowtax foreign jurisdictions, but requiring that a taxpayer
navigate through a number of antideferral hurdles to
obtain that result. Moreover, the current rules make
deferral elective for the well-advised U.S, taxpayer and
create traps for the unwary in the case of other U'S.

ral regimes

"NFrC
76Id

taxpayers, thus undermining
taxpayer confidence in
the fairness and efficiency of the tax system."
We propose ending deferral. by treating each U.S.
person" (including Ll.S. multinational
corporations)
that owns stock in a foreign corporation (regardless
of
whether the foreign corporation
is a CFC as defined
in
section 957) as if that shareholder
directly earned a pro
rata share of the foreign corporation's gross income
and expenses (regardless of whether the corporation's
income is active or passive and regardless of whether
the income is earned in the country of incorporation or
another country). Under this passthrough
approach,
each U.S. person owning stock in the foreign corporation (even if less than a 10 percent interest) would
be
required to currently include a pro rata share of that
income or expense in computing his own U.S. tax
liability. Thus, deferral would be ended with respect to
the U.S. shareholders'
full shares of all of the foreign
corporation's income, not merely certain categories of
income earned by CFCs described in section 957 (as is
true under subpart F of current law)." In addition, each
U.S. person owning stock in a foreign corporation
would be attributed a share of the foreign taxes paid
by the corporation during
the year and could claim a
direct credit for those taxes to the extent they are
creditable taxes under section 901 or section 903 and
subject to the limitations
in section 904.

study, slIpra note 2, at ix, 6-23--{;-24.
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78Asnumerous other commentators have noted, the elective nature of the deferral privilege has been fortified and
made more explicit by the Treasury Department's adoption
of
the "check-the-box" entity classification system. See T.O. 8697,
1997~1 ca. 215. Under the check-the-box classification
system, U.S. persons operating abroad through foreign entities
(other than per se foreign corporations) are more readily able
to elect whether to obtain deferral of U.S. tax on their foreignsource income by electing whether to have the foreign entities
treated as corporations or partnerships (or disregarded
as an
entity separate from its owner in the case of an entity with a
single owner) for tax purposes.
See, e.g., Avt-Yonah, "End
Deferral," supra note 7; Michael L. Schler, "Initial Thoughts on
the Proposed 'Check-the-Box'
Regulations," Tax Notes, June

17,1996,P: 1679.For example, a U.S. taxpayer is likely to elect
partnership or branch (disregarded
entity) status for a subsidiary engaged in foreign operations that are generating
losses, or for a subsidiary
operating in a high-tax foreign
country because the U.S. taxpayer can use the foreign
tax
credit to offset both the U.S. tax on the subsidiary's foreignsource income and the Ll.S. tax on other low-taxed foreignsource income earned by the U.S. taxpayer in other countries.
(The latter planning strategy works only when the high-taxed
and low-taxed foreign-source
income falls within the same

basket limitation category in section 904(d)(I). See, e.g., Gustafson, Peroni, and Pugh, supra note 3, at 293-94, 301, 471-72.)
In addition, a U.S. taxpayer
is likely
branch status for foreign subsidiaries
flow-through status will circumvent
limitations on the foreign tax credit
Schier, supra, at 1687.

to elect partnership
or
in situations in which
certain restrictions
and
under current law. See

"See section 7701 (a)(30).
"Per a more com~lete discussion

of the advantages
and
disadvantages of this pass through proposal,
see Peroni,
Fleming, and Shay, supra note 77, at 512~16.
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Under this passthrough
regime, a U.S. person
owning stock in a foreign corporation
would be
allowed to reduce his taxable income by a pro rata
share of the foreign corporation's losses."! This feature
of the proposed pass-through regime would remove
the bias that exists under current law against use of the
corporate form in international start-up situations
when significant deductions in excess of income in the
early years of a venture are anticipated.

I

Developments under section 482 do
not justify any loosening of the
antideferral limitations.

Other important features of this passthrough regime
include the following.
The character of the foreign corporation's items of
income and expense would flow through to the U.S.
shareholders
under principles similar to those
developed under section 702(b) of subchapter K and
1366(b) of subchapter S. Thus, the character distortion
caused by subpart P's constructive dividend approach
to curtailing deferral (under which all subpart F income attributed to a U.S. shareholder is treated as ordinary income)
would be avoided
with this
passthrough regime. Similarly, the distortions resulting
from subpart F's differential treatment of cross-border
and same-country income would be eliminated.
To determine each U.S. shareholder's pro rata share
of the foreign corporation's income, losses, and foreign
taxes, passthrough
rules similar to those developed
under subchapter K would apply in modified form. All
such allocations would have to survive the "substantial
economic effect" test of section 704(b)82 Alternatively,
one could adopt a principle for determining
a U.S.
shareholder's pro rata share of the foreign corporation's income, expenses, and taxes that does not allow
contractual special allocations of such items to be
determinative (notwithstanding their passing muster
under the section 704(b) regulations). Under this alternative approach, a U'S. shareholder's pro rata share of
the foreign corporation's income, expenses, and taxes
would correspond to the shareholder's economic interest in the corporation. in determining the Ll.S. shareholder's economic interest in the foreign corporation,
one could look primarily at three factors: (1) the shareholder's voting rights in the corporation; (2) the shareholder's right to participate in current earnings and

811nthe case of tiered structures of corporations,
lookthrough rules may be needed to the extent section 958 does
not solve the problem.
"Slmpliftcanon and reform of the allocation rules in subchapter K are needed
without regard to whether this
passthrough proposal is ever enacted into law. The tax abuses
~nd economic inefficiencies fostered by the allocation rules
m subchapter K have been the subject of extensive commentary. ~owever, ~ detailed discussion of the subchapter K
allocation rules IS beyond the scope of this article.

accumulated surplus; and (3) the shareholder's right
to share in the corporation's net assets on liquidation.w
There are, however, two major problems with this
alternative approach for determining
a U.S. shareholder's share of the foreign corporation's items of
income, expense, and taxes. First, in a case in which
there are multiple classes of stock with differing voting
rights, cIlvidend rights, and liquidation preferences, it
may be very cIlfficult, as a practical matter, for the U.5.
shareholder to determine his economic interest in the
foreign corporation. Second, by ignoring special allocations if a foreign corporation is used to conduct the
foreign business but continuing to respect such allocations if a partnership or LLC is used, the same choice
of entity distortions induced by the special allocation
rules in the partnership area under current law would
be perpetuated by our passthrough
proposal.
Basis adjustments similar to those in both section
705 of subchapter K and section 1367 of subchapter 5
would apply to prevent double taxation of the foreign
corporation's earnings when they are distributed to a
U.s. shareholder or a U.S. shareholder sells the corporation's stock. Thus, for example, items of income that
flow through to the U'S. shareholders would increase
those shareholders' bases in their stock in the foreign
corporation, and deductions or losses flowing through
to the U.S. shareholders would reduce their stock
bases. Distributions to the U.S. shareholders would
also reduce their bases in the corporation's stock.
Any losses flowing through from the foreign corporation to a U'.S. person owning stock in the corporation
would be limited to the extent of the U.S. shareholder's
basis in the corporation's stock and the U.S. shareholder's basis in any loans to the foreign corporation.
This loss limitation rule is analogous to the section
704(d) limit on the deduction of partnership losses and
the section 1366(d)(1)(A) limit on the deduction of 5
corporation losses.84
"These are the factors looked at by the IRS and the courts
in determining whether a shareholder is entitled to exchange
treatment on a corporate redemption under section 302(b)(1)
by reason of the redemption resulting in a meaningful reduction in the shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation. See, e.g., Roebling v. Comm'r, 77 'I'C. 3D (1981);Rev. Rul.
76-364, 1976-2CB. 91; Rev. Rul. 76-385,1976-2c.a 92; Rev.
Rul. 78-401, 1978-2c.s. 127; see generally B. Bittker and J.
Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders
par. 9.05[3] (6th ed. 1993).
"Under tills passthrough proposal, a decision would have
to be made concerning whether the subchapter K approach
to treatment of entity-level liabilities to third parties will be
followed.
In other words, should
a U.S. shareholder
be
allowed to include a pro rata share of the foreign corporation's liabilities in his adjusted basis in the stock for purposes
of determining the limitation on a shareholder's deduction
of losses
flowing through from the corporation and the
taxability of dividend distributions
to the shareholder? If so,
t~is.p:assthroug.h proposal would place great pressure on the
Iiabrlity allocation rules in subchapter K and would require
that those rules be carefully reexamined and reformulated.
Alternatively,
a sounder approach
might be to adopt the
subchapter S model here and not allow the U.S. shareholder
(Footnote 84 continued on next page.)
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Distributions from the foreign corporation would be
tax-freeto the extent of the shareholder's basis in the
,cofporation's
stock. Any distributions in excess of
" stockbasis would be treated as gain from the sale of
I thecorporation's
stock."
supp~se the U.s. person owning: stock in the foreign
corporatIon does not have sufficient information to
determine her pro rata share of the corporation's income,either because the shareholder owns a small percentageof stock in a closely held foreign corporation
thatis otherwise owned by uncooperative foreign persons or the shareholder owns a small percentage of
stockin a publicly traded foreign corporation that is
indifferent to the information needs of shareholders
underU.S. tax law.'6 As a practical matter, how would
sucha Ll.S. person determine her pro rata share of the
foreigncorporation's income and expenses? What accommodations can be made in the passthrough regime
toreflect these compliance concerns?
If the foreign corporation's stock is publicly traded,
the Ll.S. person could be given a mark-to-market election similar to the one provided in section 1296 of
current law for passive foreign investment companies.
Themechanics of this mark-to-market approach would
besimilar to those in section 1296.

financial information of the corporation, with adjust-

ments to reflect U.S. tax accounting principles for certain "material items" that could be "reasonably identified" by the D.S, person.V The reason we would limit

this alternative reporting approach to less than 10 percent shareholders is that, as a practical matter, a U.S.
person owning 10 percent or more of the voting power
of a foreign corporation should have sufficient economic clout to obtain the necessary information concerning the foreign corporation's income and deduc-

tions to report under the general pass through
approach." In determining whether a U'S. person is a
10 percent or more shareholder in the foreign corporation for this purpose, a modified version of the foreign
entity indirect ownership and constructive ownership

rules in section 958 would apply.
We recognize, however, that there may be a number
of situations when the less than 10 percent U.S. shareholders of a nonpublic1y traded foreign corporation do
not possess sufficient financial

corporation's

The proponents of the deferral
privilege have not met their burdenof
proving that the privilege shouldbe
continued, let alone expanded by
weakening the modest subpart F
limitations.
Alternatively, if the U.S. person owns a less than 10
percent stock interest in the voting power of a foreign
corporation the stock of which is not publicly traded,
the U.S. shareholder could be allowed to base the
amount of the current inclusion on generally available

t?

include
a pro rata share of the fo~eign corp?r~tio~'s
liabilities to third parties in the st'ock baSIS for loss lmutatlOn

purposes. See section 1366(d)(allowing a shareholderof an
S corpora tlon to deduct losses flowing through, from.th,e corporation only to the extent of the shareholder 5 basts In th~
S corporation stock and in any indebtedness of the 5 corpo
ration to the shareholder). However, this latter approach
.
b'
. favor of the
would perpetuate a choice~of~enhty las In.
.
partnership form of conducting a foreign business If thebu.sIne.ss is expected
to incur losses an~ will be financed WIth
third-party debt incurred by the anti ty.
~Cf. sections 301(c)(3),1368(b)(2).
.'
ht m
"Th'1S 1S
. actually a smaller pro bl em than It mig f lisee.
b.
.
.'
I eek US port 0 0 mCause foreign corporations active y s
.'
d
I deman accomvestors and this gives the latter leverage o.
IRS sit
'nodarlons. See e g Greg Steinmetz and Mlchae E' ~tie~
_ "Bigger Bang:
U.S. Investment in European tore• Galvanizes Old World,"Wall St. f., Aug. 4,1999~at:\future
, over, iJ foreign corporations are effectively ?ep[1~~ ~ate tax
U.S. portfolio
capital unless they provld~ha fo;eign correporting information to the U.S. investors, e
porations will feel strong pressure to do so.

iU;i~g

information concerning

the foreign corporation to properly report their income
under the passthrough method. Accordingly, it may be
appropriate to use a modified version of the approach
taken in section 1291of the current law PFlC provisions
_ namely, allow such less than 10 percent U.S. shareholders to defer U.S. tax on their shares of the foreign
income but

recapture the benefits

of

deferral by imposing an interest charge when the U.S.
shareholder receives an extraordinary distribution
(that is, an "excess distribution") from the corporation

or the Ll.S.shareholder sells the foreign corporation's
stock.
However, in calculating that interest charge on the
benefit of deferral, we would not use the straight-line
accrual calculation method of section 1291, which calculates the interest charge by allocating the taxpayer's
income realized at the time of an excess distribution

or

sale of the PFIC's stock over the shareholder's entire
holding period for the stock on a ratable or straight-line
basis. We would not use that method because it assumes more tax deferral than would occur if income
had been earned at a constant rate (that is, it "frontloads" the deferred income) and thus probably overcompensates for the benefits

Instead, we would calculate

of deferral in most cases.s?

the interest charge

by

using economic accrual and assuming that the undistributed income had been earned at a constant rate.

87See Shay, supra note 7, at 1061.
llSThispre~s.e is consi.stent ~i~hth~assumption underlying both the mdirect credit prOVISIons in sections 902 and 960
and the look-through rules used for foreign tax credit limi-

tation purposes in sections 904(d)(3)and 904(d)(4) that 10
percent or more U.S. shareholders in foreign corpora nons are
able to obtain detailed information
concerning a foreign corporation's income, deducttons, and foreign taxes.
895ee Stephen B. Land, "Defeating Deferral: A Proposal for

RetrospectiveTaxation," 52 Tax L. Rev. 45, 65, 67 (1996); see
also, e.g., 3 Isenbergh, supra note 16, at par. 44.16.
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Transition From. a Deferral 10 a Passthrough

Syslem'"

The transi tion from a delerral to a passthrough
regime for taxing foreign income of foreign corporations poses daunting issues. Taxable U.S. shareholders
would realize an unprecedented
windlall
il their
foreign corporations
were converted to a passthrough
regime and asset basis representing untaxed (by the
United Stales) earnings and profits were allowed to
carryover without
including pre-change
earnings in
income." It however, the current law rules governing
a change in status from a corporation to a partnership
were applied, a U.S. shareholder in a foreign corporation either would recognize gain or loss in a taxable
disposition OT, if an 80 percent corporate shareholder,
deferred earnings in a section 332 liqu idation." We
propose as a transition rule that assets be deemed
transferred to the pass through entity with a carryover
basis and that the shareholder recognize over a five
year period pre-change
accumulated
earnings and,
where appropriate,
deficits.

Conclusions
The proponents
01 the delerral privilege have not
met their burden of proving that the privilege should
be continued, let alone expanded by weakening
the
modest subpart F limitations. Accordingly,
we urge
Congress not to expand the delerral privilege by enacting any additional
exceptions to the existing subpart F
rules. Instead, given the overall structure of the code,
we believe a strong case can be made that deferral
should be further restricted or eliminated,
and that a
passthrough regime for income earned by U.S. persons
through foreign corporations would be the most eflective way to accomplish this desirable policy objective.

9Ofor a more detailed discussion of the transition issues
relating to our pass through proposal, see Peroni, Fleming, and
Shay, supra note 77, at 519~23.
"This policy issue was identified by Charles Kingson in
connection with analyzing the appropriate "toll charge" for
an inbound corporate
liquidation. See Charles L Kingson,
"The Theory and Practice of Section 367," 37th N.Y.U. inst.
all Fed. Tax'n 22-1,22-7
to 22-30 (1979).
92Theforeign corporation would be deemed to distribute
its assets to shareholders in liquidation and the shareholders
would be deemed
to recontribute the assets to the new
partnership. Treas. reg. section 301.7701-3(g)(1)(ii). Section
1248 would apply to a U.S. shareholder's taxable disposition
of CFC stock and recharacterize the gain as dividend income
to the extent of untaxed earnings and profits accumulated
during the period the shareholder was a U.S. shareholder and
the foreign .coIpo~ation was a CFe. The passthrough
entity
would obtain a fau market value basis in the assets deemed
contri?uted ba.ck ~o t~e passthrough entity, or in the case of
a section 332 liqufdation, a carryover basis.
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